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The Hungarian Parliament has enacted a package of constitutional amendments that
virtually neutralizes the Constitutional Court as an opponent of Viktor Orbáns two-
third-majority government. There was no lack of protest notes from both Strasbourg
and Brussels, but apparently to no avail. Neither the EU nor the Council of Europe
seems to be able, institutionally, to find an adequate response to a systematic
undermining of constitutionalism within member states such as Hungary or Romania.
A conspicuous deterioration in constitutionalism  erosion isn’t just the problem of
the respective member state; it affects  the entire EU and all its member states. But
what can they do? One year ago, we launched an online symposium on the proposal
of Armin von Bogdandy’s Heidelberg research group to find a solution based on
European citizenship.. Now, Jan-Werner Müller, a political theorist and historian
of ideas based at Princeton University, is offering  another proposal – to install a
"Copenhagen Commission" which monitors the broad compliance of member states
with  the political Copenhagen criteria.
Müller’s proposal will be the point of departure for a new online symposium starting
today. We invite legal and political scholars to comment on these questions:
1.  If a EU member state sets sail on a political journey that leads to a constitutional
state imcompatible with the Copenhagen criteria of democracy, rule of law and
human rights, what course of action should the  EU adopt?
2. Which of the following possibilities seems  best?
a) The European party families could isolate the member state politically (e.g.
exclusion from EP group)
b) The other member states could suspend the country’s vote (as envisaged in
Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union)
c) The EU commission could exert pressure by pursuing specific treaty infringements
d) The European Court of Justice could extend its jurisdiction on internal
fundamental rights infringements within member states (union citizenship, European
Charter of Fundamental Rights).
3. Which of these possibilities do you like least?
4. Do you see other possibilities?
5. To what extent should the EU be competent to take preemptive action against
planned constitutional amendments within member states?
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6. How should the sanction regime be designed to prevent national leaders
from exploiting the sanctions to mobilize their constituencies against the EU?  What
would be ‘smart sanctions’ in an EU context that are effective with governments, but
do not hurt ordinary citizens?
7. How should the sanction regime be designed to prevent its evolution into a
paternalistic constitutional micro-management of member states?
8. How should the sanction regime be designed to prevent the impression that it will
hit only small member states and leave large ones untouched?
9. In which cases should the EU leave the field to the Council of Europe and the
ECHR?
10. Would you welcome the installation of a „Copenhagen Commission“ that
monitors the compliance of member states with the Copenhagen criteria, analogous
to what the Venice Commission does with respect to the ECHR?
We will publish the answers during the next weeks on Verfassungsblog. We are
looking forward to a lively and fruitful debate!
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